The crisis can be an opportunity for coordination between the two nations, but Ankara and Jerusalem have conflicting interests and goals.

By Israel Kasnett, JNS

Israel’s relationship with Ankara has been characterized by fluctuations over time, marked by periods of cooperation and tension. However, Turkey’s recent posture, particularly in the aftermath of the Hamas-led massacre on Oct. 7, 2023, has been increasingly antagonistic and inconsistent.

Turkey, although a NATO member, has facilitated activities that undermine Israel’s security and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly supports groups with terrorist affiliations. For example, in July, Israel thwarted a Hamas attack orchestrated from within Turkey and Turkey now hosts the Hamas leaders who were forced out of Qatar.

Erdoğan has frequently called on Israel to refrain from military actions in Lebanon and Syria. Yet, Turkey itself appears ready to launch a military operation in Syria targeting Kurdish groups. Additionally, Erdoğan supports the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorist group, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani (who now goes by his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa).

In April, Erdoğan imposed a trade embargo on Israel, and in July he went so far as to threaten an invasion of Israel during a speech to members of his ruling party.

Erdoğan accuses Israel and the IDF of deliberately killing Palestinian civilians in its war against terrorism. However, experts say that Turkey’s own military actions in Iraqi Kurdistan, which actually target civilians, breach international humanitarian law and raise concerns about real human rights violations.

The overt support for groups such as Hamas and HTS, coupled with Turkey’s contradictory actions and rhetoric, raises questions about its dependability and commitment to regional stability.

Despite this, NATO has shown little resistance to Turkey’s behavior, highlighting the complexities of international diplomacy within the alliance.

Professor Emeritus Dror Zeevi of the Middle East Studies Department at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheva, told JNS that Turkey “no longer views the [NATO] treaty as one of its defining attributes.”

“In recent years it has flirted with China and bought arms (and a nuclear facility) from Russia,” he noted. “It is now closer to the Chinese and Russians than it is to the U.S.”

Erdoğan’s aspirations have always included “the liberation of Jerusalem” and the reemergence of a Turkish-led Ottoman Empire. A Sunni jihadi Syria provides a conveniently straight path to fulfilling that long-term dream.

Zeevi told JNS, “To the extent that this is indeed his dream (and not just internal bluster),” Erdoğan is not likely to actively pursue those objectives directly. “But under the right conditions, he might support the forces that do push in that direction, as he had supported Hamas until recently.”

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oren Marmorstein responded to Turkey’s criticism of Israel’s recent military actions in Syria, accusing Ankara of hypocrisy. He pointed out that Turkey’s own military operations in Syria and its occupation of significantly more Syrian territory than Israel’s temporary control underscore a double standard.

“Israel rejects the false statements made by the Turkish Foreign Ministry regarding Israel in relation to Syria,” Marmorstein wrote in a post on X.

“The facts are the following: Turkey has systematically encroached on Syrian territory, a process that began with military operations in 2016, 2018 and 2019, and continues to this day,” he said.

According to Marmorstein, “The last country that can speak about occupation in Syria is Turkey, with 15% of Syria’s territory under the control of proxies operating under its patronage. There is no justification for the continuation of Turkish aggression and violence against Kurds in Syria!”

Stay the course

Nimrod Goren, a senior fellow for Israeli affairs at the Middle East Institute in Washington, lamented the current nadir in Israel-Turkey relations.

“The most significant damage caused to the bilateral relations between Israel and a regional country after October 7 was with Turkey,” he told JNS.

He noted that a few weeks before the Hamas attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Erdoğan held a positive meeting in New York, vowing to increase cooperation.

“Following Turkey’s endorsement of Hamas, harsh criticism of Israel, and a decision to limit trade relations, ties are now at a low point,” Goren said. “Israeli diplomacy contributed to that, keeping the embassy in Ankara for months without an ambassador and undiplomatically bashing Turkey via social media.”

Goren called to stay the course and not getting too carried away over Erdoğan’s hostility.

“We’ve seen this dynamic before, but it’s worth remembering that Israel and Turkey have had continuous diplomatic ties since 1949, which were never cut off despite dramatic ups and downs,” he said.

In Goren’s view, “with all grievances and difficulties, now is the time to seek better communication between both countries.

“Syria was always an issue of interest for both countries to discuss, and with the downfall of [President Bashar] Assad and the increased Turkish and Israeli roles in developments there, it has become a necessity,” he said.

Goren noted the recent meeting on Hamas-related issues between security officials from both countries and said that “this should now be expanded to Syria as well.”

He suggested that international actors “should support this and should also work with both sides to tone down hostile rhetoric,” adding that a ceasefire in Gaza “will make the task easier.”

Goren pointed out that, while bilateral ties between countries “are not only between leaders and current governments, there is little appetite in Israel to engage with Erdoğan and little trust in him, especially after two failed rapprochements in recent years.”

However, he said, “there are deep national interests at play that require at least the professional echelons from both countries—diplomats and security officials—to maintain communication, prevent escalation and seek some coordination.”

Jerusalem should no doubt carefully navigate its relationship with Ankara at this time. In Zeevi’s view, the Syrian crisis “opens an opportunity to talk to all neighboring states, including Turkey, in a realpolitik approach to restrain the jihadi elements and establish democratic rule in Syria.”

However, Zeevi warned, “Israel should also be aware that Turkey’s leadership, which had breached its trust in the past, has different and sometimes opposed interests.”