Turkey’s regional ambitions and the strategic challenge for Israel

By Israel KasnettA closer examination of Turkey’s policies suggests the statement reflects a calculated communications strategy rather than a meaningful shift in Ankara’s broader approach to Israel and the region.

Former Israeli national security adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat and Turkey expert Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak told JNS that Erdoğan’s remarks should be understood within a broader political and strategic context—not as evidence of a substantive policy change.

During a recent iftar dinner in Ankara with representatives of religious minorities, Erdoğan declared, “Just as Islamophobia is a crime against humanity, antisemitism is also a crime, an evil that cannot be considered reasonable or legitimate.”

The statement drew attention, given Erdoğan’s frequent and harsh criticism of Israel in recent years, often in language that critics say crosses into antisemitic rhetoric.

Ben-Shabbat said the context of the remarks is key. “These comments were delivered while he was hosting representatives of the country’s religious minorities for an iftar dinner in Ankara,” Ben-Shabbat told JNS.

“During the event, he stated that Turkey is a model country in which everyone enjoys freedom of religion and conscience and a growing sense of mutual respect. He also emphasized that religious communities in Turkey are able to preserve and maintain their own institutions.”

According to Ben-Shabbat, the message was designed to project a specific image of the Turkish state.

“The speech was intended to convey a message of unity and reassurance to Turkey’s citizens, while underscoring the idea that the country is a ‘model state’ with regard to religious freedom,” he said. “It is also possible that this framing serves Erdoğan’s desire, at least rhetorically, to distinguish between his harsh criticism of Israeli policy, which he describes as ‘genocide,’ and his attitude, and that of his state, toward Judaism as a religion.”

Cohen Yanarocak said the remarks should be viewed primarily through the lens of international politics.

“President Erdoğan’s condemnation of antisemitism during the traditional iftar dinner with minority representatives on March 10 functions primarily as a strategic facade,” he said. “It serves as a defensive shield against accusations of antisemitism, charges fueled by his systematic efforts to delegitimize Israel on the global stage since the events of October 7, 2023.”

Since the Hamas-led attacks on that day, relations between Ankara and Jerusalem have deteriorated sharply.

‘Deliberate shift in policy’

Cohen Yanarocak, a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies and at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center, said this decline reflects a deliberate shift in Turkish policy.

“Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Turkey has pursued a deliberate policy of unilaterally degrading its relations with Israel,” he said. “This strategy encompasses political delegitimization, economic sanctions and even participation in the judicial struggle initiated by South Africa.”

At the same time, Turkey has sought to expand its regional influence across several strategic arenas.

According to Ben-Shabbat, Ankara’s ambitions are neither hidden nor modest.

“Erdoğan’s Turkey does not conceal its ambition to expand its regional influence,” he said. “Erdoğan is pursuing an assertive foreign policy that combines military power with active diplomacy in order to position Turkey as a central actor in several arenas of conflict.”

One of the most visible areas of Turkish activism is the Palestinian issue. Ankara has positioned itself as a leading supporter of Palestinian political aspirations and has expressed interest in playing a central role in rebuilding the Gaza Strip after the war.

“Turkey views itself as a patron of the Palestinian cause,” Ben-Shabbat said. “It seeks to play a major role in the reconstruction of Gaza after the war and in a potential international stabilization force.”

Turkey has also strengthened its position in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime in 2025, seeking to shape the country’s future political landscape while preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity along its border.

Israel’s perspective

At the same time, Ankara continues to promote the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, aimed at expanding Turkish influence across key maritime zones in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean.

For Israel, these ambitions intersect with another sensitive issue: Erdoğan’s ties to Islamist movements.

Ben-Shabbat pointed to Ankara’s connections with both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as a significant concern.

“Erdoğan’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and with Hamas provide these organizations with meaningful political and logistical backing, making it more difficult for Israel to isolate them on the international stage,” he said. “His alignment with Qatar on some of these issues further amplifies their influence and increases the challenge of confronting them.”

The cumulative effect of these policies has reshaped Israel’s view of Turkey’s role in the region.

Cohen Yanarocak said the relationship has entered a new strategic phase.

“With Ankara’s evident policy of encircling Israel through the ‘Neighbors of Syria’ initiative, it is accurate to describe Turkey as an actor actively challenging Jerusalem,” he said. “Consequently, Israel now defines Turkey as a ‘rival.’ Although bilateral relations established in 1949 continue, Israel’s perception of Turkey’s status will likely remain unchanged as long as the Turkish side refrains from an explicit declaration of hostilities.”

For Israeli policymakers, the relationship is now characterized by tension, competition and uncertainty.

Turkey remains a major regional power with significant military, economic and diplomatic influence. At the same time, its ideological alignment and strategic initiatives increasingly place it at odds with Israeli interests across multiple arenas.

As Ben-Shabbat put it, Israel’s approach must remain cautious but clear-eyed.