With the new regime in Syria supported by Ankara, and the deployment of Turkish forces, no one in Israel wants to be caught off guard.
Itay Ilnai
By Itay Ilnai, Israel Hayom via JNS
“Recent events in our region, especially in Syria, remind us of an important fact: Turkey is bigger than Turkey itself,” President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in a speech at the Turkish Academy of Sciences on Dec. 18.
The Turkish president’s words should be read against the backdrop of the balance of terror between his country and Israel, which have long maintained a love-hate relationship, receiving a significant twist in the wake of the current war.
This has intensified even further following the fall of the Assad regime and the establishment of the new government in Damascus, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has enjoyed long-standing support from Ankara.
This is reflected, among other things, in the recommendations of the Nagel Committee, which were submitted to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last month.
Although the committee was meant to examine the defense budget, its final report refers to the “Turkish threat” in razor-sharp words. “Israel may find itself facing a new threat that will emerge in Syria, which in some respects will be no less severe than the previous one,” it states.
“The problem will be exacerbated if the Syrian force effectively becomes a Turkish proxy, as part of Turkey’s dream of restoring the Ottoman crown to its former glory. The presence of Turkish proxies, or Turkish forces, in Syria could deepen the danger of a direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation.”
The last words need to be read again: The Nagel Committee warns the prime minister of a “direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation,” no less, and calls on him to adopt a “completely different approach of ‘zero containment’” toward Syria, which otherwise could fall like ripe fruit into the hands of Erdoğan’s military forces.
“We must take into account that the entry of the Turkish army into Syria could lead to Syria’s rearmament at a relatively high speed,” the report states.
The Turkish vision awakens
The Nagel Report is the exception that proves the rule: So far, the change in Israel’s approach to Ankara has remained largely under the radar. The political and security establishment in Israel is not interested in irritating the Turkish giant and is careful not to offend it.
On the Turkish side, however, they are doing the opposite.
As if to breathe life into the bonfire of Israeli concerns, on Feb. 4, exactly one month after the report’s publication, the new Syrian president traveled to Ankara, where he met with Erdoğan at the opulent Presidential Palace.
Reports in the media surrounding the historic meeting claimed that the two leaders were already set to discuss the signing of a joint defense agreement between Turkey and Syria, including the establishment of two Turkish air bases in central Syria and the training of the Syrian army. In American English, this is called “boots on the ground.”
There is also an escalating rhetoric from the Anatolian nation and its leader. “Turkey can invade Israel as it did in Karabakh [in Azerbaijan]and Libya,” Erdoğan threatened last July, during a meeting of his Justice and Development Party.
Even before that, he likened Netanyahu to Hitler, and claimed that the Israel Defense Forces is committing crimes against humanity in Gaza, for which he said the Israeli leadership should be “brought to justice.”
On that occasion, Erdoğan, who sees himself as a regional and to some extent religious leader, called on “the entire Muslim world” to mobilize in the struggle against Israel.
A military confrontation?
Are we indeed facing a Turkish-Israeli confrontation, as the Nagel Committee suggests? Could Erdoğan’s warnings materialize in the foreseeable future?
Turkey experts who spoke with Israel Hayom assess that in the wake of the war against Hamas and Hezbollah and what appears to be the weakening of the Shi’ite axis led by Iran, it is certainly possible that Israel is moving toward a new era, in which military confrontation between it and Turkey becomes a practical possibility.
To this, of course, one must add the rise of the new regime in Damascus, a regime that is largely a proxy of Erdoğan, which will allow Turkey to establish an overland bridge between it and Israel and to place, indirectly or directly, a military force right on its doorstep. If the confrontation between Israel and Iran has marked recent decades, it is not inconceivable that we are now on the brink of an Israel-Turkey war.
“The moment the Turks have the ability to reach us on foot, it’s significant,” said Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.
“Already today, Turkey has almost unlimited access to northern Syria, and they are talking about paving roads, railways and infrastructure throughout Syria in the future. If this happens, then one day their ability to move military forces within Syria, on a large scale, will be significant.
“Israel needs to do everything not to turn Turkey into an active enemy, because Turkey is not Iran. It’s a stronger country, with a more sophisticated army, and a much more significant strategic location than Iran. Not someone you’d want to find yourself at war with,” he said.
Noa Lazimi, a researcher at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, added, “Until now, Israel and Turkey have managed to maintain a certain degree of correct relations. Even after the Mavi Marmara flotilla episode in 2010, the countries knew how to rehabilitate their relations.
“However, during the current war, Erdoğan has intensified his attitude toward Israel, which may indicate his willingness to go further with his imperialist ideology, which also aligns with internal public opinion in Turkey.
“Recently, Erdoğan has proven that he is willing to risk what is right for his country for the sake of extreme ideology. On the other hand, Turkey is a member of NATO and has economic and security interests vis-à-vis the US, so I don’t think it would be wise for him to go all out against Israel in the short term,” she said.
Fragile relations
Since the Mavi Marmara events, Israel has been treading carefully to rehabilitate its relationship with Turkey. The diplomatic effort began to bear fruit in 2022, culminating in a meeting between President Isaac Herzog and his Turkish counterpart in Ankara. “I hope this is a turning point,” Erdoğan said at the time.
Shortly after, then-Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid also met with Erdoğan on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. “And yet,” said a former senior official in the defense establishment, “we have always had a very great suspicion toward Turkey.”
This suspicion proved itself after the outbreak of the current Gaza war. In September 2023, Netanyahu and Erdoğan still managed to meet on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, declaring that “our ties are strengthening.”
However, a month later the war broke out, and the “strengthening ties” ran aground: Turkey froze trade with Israel, the national airline Turkish Airlines stopped its flights to Ben-Gurion Airport to the dismay of many Israelis, and Erdoğan, as mentioned, compared Netanyahu to Hitler and threatened to invade Israel so that it could no longer use its army against the Palestinians, or anyone else.
“Who can guarantee that when they finish destroying Gaza, they won’t turn their gaze to Antalya?” the Turkish president wondered.
All this happened while Turkey, which already has one of the largest and strongest armies in the Middle East, is increasingly strengthening militarily. In recent years, it has become a force to be reckoned with when it comes to offensive UAVs, developed ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km (1,242 miles) that can reach any point in Israel, and has even begun to seriously engage with the idea of establishing a nuclear program (ostensibly for civilian purposes).
Meanwhile, Turkey supported Azerbaijan militarily in its war against Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, invaded Libya as part of the civil war, deepened its control in Cyprus, and effectively established a Turkish army in northern Syria, which fought against the Assad regime until its overthrow.
“Erdoğan is a leader with Islamist, neo-Ottoman aspirations, and he sought to brand Turkey as a military power to elevate its status to a country that can lead the Sunni Muslim world. On the ground, we see this in many arenas where the Turks are present today—Azerbaijan, Libya, Cyprus, and, of course, the deep involvement in Syria,” Lazimi said.
The moves in Syria are the cornerstone of Erdoğan’s expansionist policy.
‘Turkey’s Security Paradigm’
In October 2021, Israeli Foreign Ministry official Shlomit Sofa, “Yossi” from the Prime Minister’s Office, and Col. Uri from the IDF Intelligence Directorate published an article in the military journal Ma’arachot under the title “Turkey’s Security Paradigm.”
According to them, this paradigm “has undergone substantial changes under Erdoğan’s rule … and it brings to expression the concept of political Islam from the school of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood.’”
They contend that Ankara has adopted an “active and assertive” approach based on political and military independence, and “in Turkey’s view, Iran and Israel interfere with its plans and aspirations in the Syrian, Iraqi, Azerbaijani, Palestinian and other arenas.”
Turkey, the article continues, is also expanding its influence within Israel, among Muslim citizens of Israel, and especially in Jerusalem. In this context, Turkey funds Islamic associations and provides scholarships to Muslim students.
But Turkey has concentrated most of its efforts, as mentioned, in Syria. The symbiosis between Ankara and the Syrian rebels, led by the new President al-Sharaa, came to greater expression in recent months.
After the overthrow of the Assad regime, the ties between Erdoğan and al-Sharaa became overt: Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan arrived at the Presidential Palace in Damascus, where he met with al-Sharaa. This meeting, by the way, was the first time al-Sharaa shed his military uniform and dressed in a suit and tie.
“I do not doubt that the suit and tie were brought to al-Sharaa by Turkey, if not physically then metaphorically,” said Yanarocak. “Until then, al-Sharaa walked around in uniform and had a stigma of a terrorist. The Turks turned him into a statesman.”
According to Yanarocak, the transformation that al-Sharaa underwent also symbolizes the way Erdoğan perceives him. “Erdoğan looks at Syria as flesh of Turkey’s flesh, and not as a satellite state,” he explained. “I am convinced that from Erdoğan’s perspective, al-Sharaa is nothing more than the Ottoman governor of Syria.”
The cooperation between Ankara and the new regime in Damascus is worrying, but some of the experts we spoke with suggest not to lose one’s composure.
“On one hand, al-Sharaa owes his success to Turkey,” said Dr. Carmit Valensi, head of the Syria program and senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. “On the other hand, it’s very clear that he currently wants to disconnect, or at least reduce, Syria’s dependence on foreign factors.
“His foreign minister recently said that they would like to see less foreign presence in Syria, including of Turkey. At the same time, al-Sharaa is also talking with the Saudis, Qataris, and in fact the whole world, including the West.
Until the situation in Syria stabilizes, Valensi recommends not rushing to declare al-Sharaa a Turkish puppet, as his predecessor, Bashar Assad, was an Iranian puppet. “Turkey is not Iran, and Erdoğan is not [Iranian Supreme Leader] Ali Khamenei,” she said.
“True, Erdoğan has Ottoman aspirations, but he is a much more pragmatic player than a fundamentalist who wants to spread the Islamic revolution. I wouldn’t rush to position Turkey as Israel’s new enemy, there is room for dialogue and cooperation with it.”
Originally published by Israel Hayom.