Washington has signaled in multiple briefings and diplomatic statements that it intends to allow Turkey and Qatar to play prominent roles in Gaza’s post-war stabilization.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently noted “very positive meetings” with Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on potential contributions to the emerging International Stabilization Force (ISF) and related reconstruction mechanisms.

Both U.S. Vice President JD Vance and State Department officials have described Muslim-majority participation as a central design feature of the plan, specifically citing Turkey and Qatar as “regional partners” under active discussion.

Doha’s role has been emphasized repeatedly by U.S. officials as essential to the diplomatic track. Rubio called Qatar “the one country in the world that can help mediate [the conflict],” and confirmed that Washington has asked it to “continue to play a constructive role in trying to bring [the conflict]to an end.”

Rubio further emphasized Qatar’s critical financial role in the rebuilding of Gaza. U.S. envoys have maintained a dedicated diplomatic channel with Qatar, focused on reconstruction aid, ceasefire enforcement and ongoing hostage-recovery negotiations.

Washington has openly signaled its intention to embed Turkish and Qatari defense liaisons in early coordination structures surrounding the newly established Civil-Military Coordination Center, located in Kiryat Gat, Israel, near the Gaza border, under U.S. Central Command.

“Embedded in [CENTCOM’s] team of 200 people will be probably a bunch of people from the Egyptian armed forces who will help, the Qatari armed forces who will help, as well as the Turks and probably the Emiratis,” a U.S. official told the New York Post in a recent interview.

Robert Silverman, an expert on U.S. Mideast policy at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and a former senior U.S. diplomat, explained that for Washington, engaging Turkey and Qatar serves a clear strategic interest. Both governments hold unique leverage over Hamas, Qatar through its financial networks and mediation channels and Turkey through political access and historical support.

“Unlike previous U.S. peace initiatives, this plan is organized to also have the support of countries that have generally backed the Palestinians, like Qatar and Turkey. Turkey and Qatar taking part in this operation is a critical part of the plan and something that the U.S. hopes to use to isolate Hamas,” Silverman told JNS.

Concerns from Israel and the Gulf States

Despite U.S. aspirations, Israeli officials have set some boundaries surrounding Turkish and Qatari involvement and have stated unequivocally that Turkey will not be permitted to participate militarily in any Gaza stabilization mission.

A recent statement from the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office said, “There will be no Turkish involvement,” describing such action as a “red line.” The issue of Turkish troops in Gaza was further raised by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a recent meeting with Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad. Netanyahu later told the press that Jerusalem and Cairo were aligned on this issue, saying, “There is no disagreement.”

Netanyahu also openly expressed his concern surrounding this issue with Vance. In a joint press conference, when asked about potential Turkish involvement in Gaza, Netanyahu replied, “We will decide together about that. I have very strong opinions about that. Want to guess what they are?”

In recent Cabinet remarks, Netanyahu added, “We are in control of our security, and we have also made it clear regarding international forces that Israel will determine which forces are unacceptable to us, and this is how we operate and will continue to operate.”

Despite the divergence over Turkey’s possible participation, both Jerusalem and Washington have underscored that cooperation on Gaza’s post-war framework remains intact. U.S. officials have repeatedly emphasized that all stabilization measures will proceed in consultation with Israel and that no foreign troops will deploy without its approval.

Vance stated during a press briefing that “what troops are on the ground is going to be a question the Israelis have to agree to,” adding that the United States “is not going to force anything on our Israeli friends when it comes to foreign troops on their soil.”

The message was echoed by Rubio, who said the two governments are “in constant coordination” and that the international force would have to be made up of “countries that Israel’s comfortable with.”

However, Silverman observed that Israel can’t expect to be fully content with the final implementation of the Trump plan. “It has to be understood that this is a U.S. plan, not an Israeli plan, and because of that, the plan is going to have some things that Israel may not like or will not be 100% aligned with Israel’s interests,” Silverman said, noting that this may mean a larger role for Turkey and Qatar than Israel would like.

U.S. placation of Israeli concerns is not merely a sign of the strong relations between Washington and Jerusalem, but also the result of broader regional concern over the involvement of Turkey and Qatar in post-war Gaza.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have voiced clear reservations about the inclusion of Turkey and Qatar in Gaza’s post-war stabilization plan. According to the Israeli i24NEWS outlet, Gulf sources have indicated that “Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are warning the Americans to take a much tougher line with Hamas as well as with ‘mediators’ Qatar and Turkey.”

The report further says that the moderate Gulf states have warned that “unless Hamas is fully disarmed as per the Trump plan, the Saudis and Emiratis will walk away and won’t contribute a single dirham to reconstruction.”

Turkey and Qatar’s support for Hamas

The disagreement over Turkish and Qatari participation in Gaza’s post-war framework is shaped by both countries’ long-standing ties with Hamas. Each has hosted senior representatives of the movement and provided political backing during every major escalation since the group took control of Gaza in 2007.

Turkey’s alignment with Hamas has been explicit and sustained. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly rejected Western and Israeli designations of Hamas as a terrorist organization, declaring in 2023 that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization. It is a liberation group waging a battle to protect its lands and its people.” Turkish state media have consistently described Hamas as a legitimate Palestinian faction, and Turkish officials have publicly met with its leadership over the past decade.

Qatar, for its part, has served as Hamas’s principal financial and diplomatic sponsor for more than a decade. Since 2012, Doha has transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas in coordination with Israel. It also hosts Hamas’s political office and maintains direct communication channels with the organization’s leadership, enabling it to mediate ceasefires and hostage negotiations, while simultaneously backing Hamas’s survival as a key player in Gaza.

Turkey’s push for a role in Gaza’s future

While Israel and the U.S. debate Turkish involvement, Ankara has actively lobbied to secure its place in the reconstruction of Gaza. Turkey has consistently declared its readiness to participate in Gaza’s post-war arrangements. Erdoğan said Ankara is “ready to provide all kinds of support to Gaza,” and confirmed that the Turkish Armed Forces “could serve in a military or civilian capacity as needed.”

Furthermore, Turkey has already established an operational presence in Gaza through state-backed and affiliated organizations. Humanitarian convoys, medical teams, and heavy equipment bearing Turkish markings have entered the enclave through Egyptian crossings.

Much of this activity has been coordinated with the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), a Turkish NGO with extensive links to terrorist financing. In Gaza, IHH teams have distributed aid, cleared rubble and begun infrastructure repairs under Turkish flags, giving Ankara a visible footprint on the ground.

Ankara has further mounted a diplomatic campaign to secure Arab and Muslim endorsement for its participation in Gaza’s stabilization. Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have recently visited Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, seeking political and financial backing for Turkey’s proposal to take part in the ISF and in other aspects of Gaza’s reconstruction. Turkish media described Erdoğan’s Gulf tour as a key step in “gaining Arab approval for Turkish involvement.”

Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, explained that Turkey’s pursuit of a Gaza role is tied to its wider regional strategy. Yanarocak noted that Turkey’s first goal would be the preservation of Hamas. “Turkey is doing its best to ensure Hamas’s survival,” he explained.

Yanarocak further noted that, in addition to practical considerations surrounding Hamas, Turkey also sought to elevate its status while weakening Israel diplomatically.

“Turkey would like to gain status. For the first time in a long time, Ankara was recognized as a critical regional actor,” he explained. “Turkey wishes to position itself as a superpower backing the Palestinians in a mirror image of the U.S.’s backing of Israel. By doing this, they are elevating themselves to the level of the United States and degrading Israel to the level of Hamas.”

Furthermore, Yanarocak warned that Erdogan was interested in aggressive expansionism and that the Turks were likely to perceive a foothold in Gaza as a forward operating base against Israel, rather than as a peacekeeping operation.

Yanarocak brought the example of Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus as a precedent for how Turkey was likely to view Gaza. “Turkey’s role as a guarantor in Cyprus later led to its military intervention in the north of the island,” Yanarocak said. “Turkey is definitely looking at Gaza similarly.”

Erdogan has already described Turkey’s military aspirations in relation to Israel. “Just like we entered Karabakh [Azerbaijan], just like we entered Libya, we might do something similar to Israel,” Erdogan said in a speech in July 2024.

Yanarocak pointed out that Turkish forces in Gaza would put Israel on a fast track to military conflict with Turkey. “Turkey is trying to acquire a diplomatic status that will allow it to intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more directly in favor of the Palestinians. And in some extreme cases, this can definitely escalate to military conflict,” he concluded.

Shimon Sherman is a columnist covering global security, Middle Eastern affairs, and geopolitical developments.